Section 224 and the Disappearing Vote
The 2027 defense bill contains a quiet plan to convert U.S. military support for Israel from an aid check Congress votes on into an industrial partnership it can barely see.
Update — June 4, 2026. The House Armed Services Committee turned back an amendment from Ro Khanna to strike Section 224 from the defense bill. It failed on a voice vote, with only Khanna and Sara Jacobs in support, and Section 224 advanced as part of the committee-approved NDAA. The fight now moves to the House floor, where Thomas Massie has promised an amendment to remove it. Two members were willing to force the issue. The rest let it through. The floor may be the last chance to make anyone vote on this in the open.
On May 26, the House Armed Services Committee released the chairman’s mark of the Fiscal Year 2027 National Defense Authorization Act, H.R. 8800.12 The committee marks it up on June 4, and the Senate Armed Services Committee has not yet scheduled its own version.23 The bill carries a national-defense topline of about $1.14 trillion.4 Most of it is the ordinary machinery of the Pentagon. One provision is not ordinary, and it is getting almost none of the attention its consequences deserve.
Section 224 is titled the “United States–Israel Defense Technology Cooperation Initiative.”1 Precision is the whole point here, so I want to separate what the text says from what people are saying about it. I have read the statutory language. The full text is appended at the bottom of this piece, because you should not have to take my word for any of it.
What the text actually says
Section 224 directs the Secretary of Defense to designate an “executive agent,” a single accountable official in the Pentagon’s own terminology, “responsible for synchronizing cooperative efforts between the United States and Israel.”1 The operative verb is shall. The designation is mandatory, not discretionary.
That official’s assigned job is to “expand and accelerate” joint research, development, testing, evaluation, integration, and industrial cooperation, and the text spells out the means.1 Among the listed functions: identify Israeli-origin technologies for integration into U.S. systems and “programs of record”; move joint work out of research and into U.S. “procurement and acquisition pathways”; and build “frameworks for joint ventures, licensing agreements, and United States-based co-production or manufacturing partnerships with Israeli industry.”1 The provision instructs that official to coordinate across the Defense Innovation Unit, DARPA, the Missile Defense Agency, the existing U.S.-Israel Operations-Technology Working Group, and the military departments.1
Then it lists the domains this cooperation may run through, and the list is not narrow.1 It moves from counter-drone systems, anti-tunneling, and missile defense, where the two governments already work together, into “artificial intelligence, quantum, machine learning, and autonomous systems,” “cyber defense, electronic warfare, and digital resilience,” “biotechnology,” and the phrase that should give any taxpayer pause: “network integration, data fusion, and contested logistics.”1
Network integration and data fusion are not slogans. I spent roughly fifteen years building and overseeing federal technology systems across Medicare, the FDA, the Health Insurance Marketplace, and the VA. When you fuse two parties’ data and integrate their networks, you are not lending a capability you can later take back. You are merging plumbing. Unwinding it afterward is slow, expensive, and sometimes simply not possible.
That is a sovereignty question and a national-security question, and it deserves to be argued as one rather than waved through.
In fairness, the section is not silent on oversight. It requires an interim briefing to the defense committees within 180 days, annual reports through 2030, and “periodic, unclassified updates” on a public Defense Department website.1 But read the qualifier. Those public updates are required only “to the maximum extent practicable,” and the text expressly carves out anything touching classified information, operational security, export controls, or “sensitive technology.”1
In a program whose entire subject matter is sensitive defense technology, that exception swallows most of the substance. The transparency clause is real, but it is also incredibly thin.
Why this is happening now
Section 224 is not arriving in a vacuum. It is arriving the year before the money runs out.
Since 2016, U.S. support has run on a ten-year Memorandum of Understanding covering fiscal years 2019 through 2028: $3.3 billion a year in Foreign Military Financing plus $500 million a year for cooperative missile defense, $38 billion in all.56 By the Congressional Research Service’s accounting, the United States has provided Israel roughly $174 billion in bilateral assistance and missile-defense funding to date, in non-inflation-adjusted dollars.6 That MOU expires in 2028, and renegotiation is underway now.
Here is the part worth understanding. Israeli officials, including Prime Minister Netanyahu, have signaled they want to phase out grant aid. While that sounds like a step toward winding support down, it’s actually the opposite. As the Quincy Institute’s Steven Simon documents, what is actually being backed is a reorganization: moving billions out of State Department aid grants, which Congress votes on every year, and into Pentagon procurement accounts, industrial partnerships, and sustainment pipelines, where oversight is limited and an annual public vote is not the mechanism.57 The relationship would become, in Simon’s words, deeper and less transparent at the same time.5
That is what Section 224 builds — the scaffolding for the relationship that replaces the expiring deal. It sits inside a broader Israel package in the same bill: Section 1221 extends the U.S. war reserve stockpile in Israel to 2029, Section 1222 extends and broadens anti-tunneling cooperation to 2029, and Section 1223 extends counter-drone cooperation to 2029.1 Several of those same subjects reappear in Section 224’s list of domains, which tells you 224 is a new strategic layer placed on top of authorities that already existed.
Follow the money and the same shape appears.
The mark’s funding tables carry roughly $670 million in Israel-specific defense lines, up from about $500 million in the enacted FY2026 bill: $300 million for Israeli Cooperative Programs, $150 million for the Arrow 3 upper-tier system, $100 million each for the Israel counter-drone and subterranean programs, and $20 million for Iron Dome.8 Those figures were compiled from the bill’s funding tables by the Daily Caller News Foundation and corroborated by a second outlet, and the $300 million Israeli Cooperative Programs line, the long-running joint missile-defense account, matches its established level in the federal budget.89 The last two of those lines, counter-drone and subterranean, fund the very authorities that Sections 1222 and 1223 extend, which is how the dollars and the authorizing language line up.
It also did not appear from nowhere. The concept has been assembled over several years of standalone bills: the U.S.-Israel Future of Warfare Act, introduced in 2023 by Representative Joe Wilson and a bipartisan Senate group, which created a $50-million-a-year emerging-technology fund; the U.S.-Israel Defense Partnership Act of 2025 from Wilson and Donald Norcross; and, this February, Representative Ronny Jackson’s U.S.-Israel FUTURES Act, H.R. 7540.10111213 The watchdog group Track AIPAC has characterized Section 224 as folding in elements of Jackson’s bill.10
One point for accuracy, since it has been muddled in early coverage: Jackson’s bill is titled the FUTURES Act, not the “Future of Warfare Act,” which was Wilson’s.1311 The throughline is a sustained, well-organized, AIPAC-aligned effort to convert one-off authorities into permanent structure.
Why it matters
Strip away the acronyms and this is a question about self-government.
Today, support for Israel is something Congress affirmatively votes on. Every year there is a number, a debate, and a recorded vote that constituents can see and react to. Section 224, and the successor arrangement it anticipates, would migrate that relationship into defense acquisition and co-production, where there is no annual up-or-down moment, and where, once joint programs and shared supply chains exist, the difficulty of unwinding them becomes its own argument against ever doing so. Analysts call this “lock-in.”10 It also quietly reduces American leverage, because you cannot easily withhold a capability you are jointly building and on which you have made yourself dependent.10
This is happening at the exact moment the public is moving the other way.
In a recent Institute for Global Affairs survey, only 16 percent of Americans said the United States should keep supplying Israel weapons without new restrictions; 38 percent said stop entirely, and 24 percent said condition them on how they are used.147 A New York Times poll found 64 percent thought the decision to strike Iran was wrong.157 The discomfort is bipartisan. Senator Chris Van Hollen, who represents Maryland, used a New York Times op-ed to criticize his own party’s reflexive and unconditional support for Israeli governments.167 Representative Thomas Massie, who had criticized aid to Israel, was defeated in his May 19 Kentucky Republican primary, in a race widely reported as among the most expensive House primaries in modern American history, against a challenger backed by pro-Trump and pro-Israel groups.17 Massie has said he will offer an amendment to strike Section 224 if it reaches the House floor.10
I want to be exact about what this critique is, because the conflation is deliberate and worth refusing. The objection runs to process and accountability, not to identity or to Israel’s right to defend itself. Scrutinizing a lobbying apparatus and the structure of federal appropriations is ordinary self-government, and it is the same scrutiny I would apply to any country, any industry, and any line item.
Treating that scrutiny as bigotry is a tactic for ending a debate before it begins, and I will not participate in it, from any direction.
My opponents have records on this
Section 224 is a Washington story, but it lands on a local question. The two other people who want to represent this district have records on exactly what Section 224 is about, U.S. military support for Israel, and those records are not abstract.
The incumbent, April McClain Delaney, voted for the FY2026 NDAA last September.18 One of her first foreign-policy votes in office was for H.R. 23, the bill to sanction those who assist the International Criminal Court’s prosecution of Prime Minister Netanyahu and his former defense minister over alleged war crimes in Gaza. It passed 243 to 140, and Jewish Insider named her as one of ten freshman Democrats who supported it.1920 When Israel struck Iran in June 2025, she said the United States “must support Israel’s right to self-defense.”18 She welcomed the October 2025 ceasefire while emphasizing that Hamas must be permanently disarmed.18
That is a coherent record. It is also, plainly, a record in favor of the relationship Section 224 is designed to entrench, including the parts of it that would operate beyond an annual vote.
David Trone, who held this seat before her and is running to take it back, was during his years in the House among the most prominent pro-Israel Democrats in Congress, and something rarer than a recipient of the lobby’s money. He was a donor to it. His own campaign confirmed to The Lever that in 2023 he was an AIPAC “Minyan member,” the group’s designation for those who pledge $100,000 a year.21 During his 2024 Senate run he also took in roughly $106,000 routed through AIPAC’s PAC, even while saying he refused PAC money on principle and self-funding the race with more than $60 million of his own.2122
His position on the war moved with the politics. In November 2023 he told the Baltimore Jewish Council there should be “no ceasefire in Israel until Hamas is completely eradicated.”23 By late January 2024, in the middle of a competitive Senate primary, he was calling for a ceasefire, though a conditional one tied to the return of hostages and prefaced with “my position hasn’t changed” and continued support for Israel’s campaign against Hamas; Jewish Insider still described him as the most outspokenly pro-Israel lawmaker in the race.24 Only at a March town hall did he go further, backing a permanent ceasefire and Netanyahu’s resignation and saying “a life is a life.”25 In between, on January 23, he signed a 210-member letter denouncing South Africa’s genocide case against Israel at the International Court of Justice as “grossly unfounded and defamatory.”26 Across every shift, the constant was alignment with the institutional pro-Israel position, and it was his opponent in that primary, not Trone, who backed conditioning aid.22
I lay this out not to litigate anyone’s character but because Section 224 is a vote, or it ought to be, and votes are where records get made. Neither of them has said anything about Section 224 specifically, and I will not put words in their mouths. But the question this provision forces, whether to deepen and entrench this relationship or to step back from it, is one their records already answer.
Where I stand
My position has not changed, and this provision sharpens it. I support ending U.S. military aid to Israel, not fine-tuning it. But you do not have to share that position to see the problem with Section 224, and that is precisely what makes it dangerous. It is engineered so that the underlying question never has to be asked out loud again.
I have spent my career inside federal contracting and federal technology, and I have watched how consequential decisions get moved out of public view and into procurement, where accountability is thin and citizens have no obvious place to push back. Section 224 is that maneuver, applied to one of the most consequential military relationships the United States maintains. The honest path is the opposite one. If Congress wants to deepen this relationship, it should do it in daylight, in the text, on the record, in front of the people who pay for it. Strike it from the mark, or debate it fully on the floor. A structural change of this magnitude should not move through as a quiet subtitle while the country is looking somewhere else.
The committee takes up the bill on June 4. The text is public. Read it.
Appendix: Section 224 as introduced in the Chairman’s Mark of H.R. 8800
Federal statutory text is a U.S. Government work and in the public domain. Reproduced verbatim from the bill-language section of the FY27 NDAA chairman’s mark.1
SEC. 224. UNITED STATES–ISRAEL DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY COOPERATION INITIATIVE.
(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary of Defense shall designate an executive agent, as such term is defined in Department of Defense Directive 5101.01 (relating to DoD Executive Agent, issued February 7, 2022), responsible for synchronizing cooperative efforts between the United States and Israel, to expand and accelerate bilateral defense technology research, development, testing, evaluation, integration, and industrial cooperation, by—
(1) identifying jointly developed or Israeli-origin technologies with operational utility for potential integration into United States systems and programs of record;
(2) ensuring collaborative research initiatives involving government, private sector, and academic institutions in the United States and Israel, is done in a manner that protects sensitive technology and information and the national security interests of the United States and Israel;
(3) facilitating the transition of technologies from research and development into procurement and acquisition pathways;
(4) establishing frameworks for joint ventures, licensing agreements, and United States-based co-production or manufacturing partnerships with Israeli industry;
(5) coordinating with relevant Department of Defense components, including the Irregular Warfare Technical Support Directorate, capability development and innovation divisions, the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, the Defense Innovation Unit, the United States-Israel Operations Technology Working Group, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Missile Defense Agency, the United States Space Command, the military departments, and other Department of Defense entities, as appropriate, to align efforts and avoid duplication; and
(6) promoting joint training exercises and information-sharing mechanisms to enhance operational readiness to deploy jointly developed technologies.
(b) COOPERATIVE EFFORTS.—The synchronized cooperative efforts under subsection (a) may be carried out through the following domains:
(1) Counter-Unmanned Systems including aerial, maritime, and ground platforms.
(2) Anti-tunneling and subterranean threats.
(3) Missile and air defense technologies.
(4) Artificial intelligence, quantum, machine learning, and autonomous systems.
(5) Directed energy and advanced sensing.
(6) Cyber defense, electronic warfare, and digital resilience.
(7) Biotechnology, biomanufacturing, and medical defense.
(8) Network integration, data fusion, and contested logistics.
(9) Defense industrial base cooperation, manufacturing, and co-production.
(10) Other emerging technologies as jointly agreed by the United States and Israel.
(c) ACTIVITIES IN COORDINATION WITH OTHER FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES.—The Secretary of Defense shall coordinate activities, as appropriate, with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, and the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies, to ensure consistency with existing laws and regulations.
(d) INTERIM PROGRESS UPDATE.—Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall provide to the congressional defense committees an interim briefing on—
(1) the executive agent designated pursuant to subsection (a) and the efforts undertaken by such executive agent to lead Department of Defense implementation of the synchronized cooperative efforts described in such subsection;
(2) the status of coordination, Department-wide, with Israeli counterparts;
(3) initial technology areas identified for accelerated cooperation and technologies with operational utility for integration into United States systems and programs of record; and
(4) any early transition, prototyping, or integration activities initiated during the period covered by the update.
(e) ANNUAL REPORT.—Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter until 2030, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on implementation of the cooperative efforts described in subsection (a). Each such report shall include—
(1) a description of activities conducted;
(2) an assessment of progress made in advancing shared national security interests;
(3) an assessment of collaboration with other relevant Federal programs;
(4) a description of technologies transitioned into United States acquisition programs or fielded systems;
(5) a description of partnerships established with United States and Israeli industry; and
(6) recommendations for future opportunities to promote the long-term integration of joint capabilities between the United States and Israel.
(f) FORM.—Each report required under subsection (e) shall be submitted in unclassified form and may include a classified annex.
(g) PUBLIC TRANSPARENCY.—The Secretary of Defense shall make available on a publicly accessible website of the Department of Defense periodic, unclassified updates, to the maximum extent practicable, on the synchronized cooperative efforts carried out under subsection (a), including a description of how these efforts contribute to United States technological and military supremacy. Such updates shall be made in a manner that ensures that classified information or other information that would compromise operational security, export controls, or sensitive technology are not released.
Sources & Footnotes
House Armed Services Committee, Chairman’s Mark of H.R. 8800, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2027 — Section 224 (bill-language section), and §§ 1221–1223 (Subtitle C, Matters Relating to Israel). Full text: https://armedservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/fy27_ndaa_chairmans_mark_-_final.pdf ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12
House Armed Services Committee (Democrats), “Rogers and Smith Release Text of the FY27 NDAA, Announce Markup Date” (markup scheduled Thursday, June 4, 2026). https://democrats-armedservices.house.gov/2026/5/rogers-and-smith-release-text-of-the-fy27-ndaa-announce-markup-date ↩ ↩2
John M. Donnelly, “NDAA mark unveiled by House Armed Services Committee chairman,” Roll Call, May 27, 2026 (June 4 markup; Senate Armed Services Committee markup not yet scheduled). https://rollcall.com/2026/05/27/ndaa-mark-unveiled-by-house-armed-services-committee-chairman/ ↩
“House Armed Services Committee Releases NDAA Proposal,” Aviation Week / Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, May 26, 2026 (chairman’s mark released May 26; ~$1.14 trillion national-defense topline matching the administration’s request). https://aviationweek.com/defense/budget-policy-operations/house-armed-services-committee-releases-ndaa-proposal ↩
Steven Simon, “The Disappearing Aid Check: The Future of US–Israel Defense Support,” Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. https://quincyinst.org/research/the-disappearing-aid-check-the-future-of-us-israel-defense-support/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3
Congressional Research Service, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel (RL33222), via Congress.gov (2016 MOU: $38 billion over FY2019–FY2028, comprising $33 billion FMF and $5 billion missile defense; approximately $174 billion in total bilateral assistance and missile-defense funding to date). https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/RL33222 ↩↩2
Ben Freeman, “Congress quietly moves to integrate US and Israeli militaries,” Responsible Statecraft (Quincy Institute), May 29, 2026. https://responsiblestatecraft.org/israel-us-military/ ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4
“Swamp’s New Draft Defense Bill Would Open Up Billion-Dollar Taxpayer Purse For Foreign Countries,” Daily Caller News Foundation, May 28, 2026 (Israel-specific lines in the FY27 NDAA chairman’s mark: $300M Israeli Cooperative Programs, $150M Arrow 3, $100M Israel Counter-UXS, $100M Israel Subterranean, $20M Iron Dome; ~$670M total versus ~$500M enacted in FY2026). Same line items independently reported by The New American, “House NDAA Would Create New U.S.-Israel Military Integration Framework,” May 2026. https://dailycallernewsfoundation.org/2026/05/28/swamps-new-draft-defense-bill-would-open-up-billion-dollar-taxpayer-purse-for-foreign-countries/ ↩ ↩2
HigherGov, budget detail for Israeli Cooperative Programs, RDT&E budget line item 0603913C (request of $300.0M), corroborating the Israeli Cooperative Programs figure. https://www.highergov.com/budget/israeli-cooperative-programs-2a54231/ ↩
Caolán Magee, “US Congress moves to deepen military ties with Israel: Why it matters,” Al Jazeera, May 31, 2026 (Section 224 domains; Track AIPAC’s characterization of the Jackson bill; analyst commentary on “lock-in” and reduced U.S. leverage; Massie’s pledge to offer a floor amendment). https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/5/31/us-congress-moves-to-deepen-military-ties-with-israel-why-it-matters ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5
Office of Rep. Joe Wilson, “Wilson Leads Introduction of the United States-Israel Future of Warfare Act of 2023,” March 24, 2023 ($50 million per year, FY2024–FY2028, for emerging-technology defense collaboration). https://joewilson.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/wilson-leads-introduction-of-the-united-states-israel-future-of-warfare ↩ ↩2
Office of Rep. Joe Wilson, “Wilson and Norcross Introduce United States-Israel Defense Partnership Act,” February 14, 2025. https://joewilson.house.gov/media/press-releases/wilson-and-norcross-introduce-united-states-israel-defense-partnership-act ↩
H.R. 7540, “United States-Israel Framework for Upgraded Technologies, Unified Research, and Enhanced Security Act of 2026” (United States-Israel FUTURES Act of 2026), introduced February 12, 2026 by Rep. Ronny Jackson, via GovInfo. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BILLS-119hr7540ih/pdf/BILLS-119hr7540ih.pdf ↩ ↩2
Institute for Global Affairs, War President report, “Shifting Views of Israel” (May 19, 2026), verified at source: 16% say keep supplying Israel weapons without new restrictions, 38% want to stop entirely, 24% want them conditioned on use; 45% say the relationship does more to hurt U.S. interests than help. https://instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2026/05/war-president-israel/ ↩
New York Times/Siena poll (mid-May 2026), as reported by Responsible Statecraft and Al Jazeera (64% said the decision to strike Iran was wrong). https://www.nytimes.com/2026/05/18/us/politics/poll-trump-republicans-midterms-iran.html ↩
Chris Van Hollen, opinion essay on Democratic policy toward Israel, The New York Times, May 26, 2026 (as cited by Responsible Statecraft). https://www.nytimes.com/2026/05/26/opinion/democrats-israel.html ↩
“Republican Thomas Massie who stood up to Trump defeated in Kentucky primary,” Al Jazeera, May 20, 2026; and “Live Results: Kentucky midterm congressional primaries,” PBS News / Associated Press (Massie lost the May 19 GOP primary in Kentucky’s 4th District to Trump-backed Ed Gallrein). https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/5/20/republican-thomas-massie-who-stood-up-to-trump-defeated-in-kentucky-primary ↩
Office of Rep. April McClain Delaney: “Rep. McClain Delaney Votes to Support Service Members and Military Families” (FY2026 NDAA, Sept. 11, 2025); “Statement on Israel’s Strike on Iran” (June 13, 2025); “Statement on Israel-Hamas Ceasefire Agreement” (Oct. 9, 2025). https://mcclaindelaney.house.gov/media/press-releases ↩ ↩2↩3
Marc Rod, “House passes bipartisan ICC sanctions for a second time,” Jewish Insider, January 21, 2025 (naming April McClain Delaney among ten freshman Democrats who supported H.R. 23). https://jewishinsider.com/2025/01/house-of-representatives-international-criminal-court-sanctions-israel/ ↩
H.R. 23, Illegitimate Court Counteraction Act — House Roll Call 7, January 9, 2025 (passed 243–140, 1 present); bill text and summary via Congress.gov. The measure responds to the ICC’s November 2024 arrest warrants for PM Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant. https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/23↩
E. A. Halevi, “AIPAC’s War Chest Is Growing as the War on Gaza Rages,” Jacobin / reporting by The Lever, February 1, 2024 (Trone campaign confirmed he was a $100,000-a-year AIPAC “Minyan member” in 2023; ~$105,600 received via the AIPAC PAC in the 2024 cycle). https://jacobin.com/2024/02/aipac-donations-israel-gaza-war ↩ ↩2
“In Maryland, AIPAC has poured $4.2M into a congressional primary where Israel is not an issue,” JTA / Jewish Community of Louisville, May 14, 2024 (Trone a $100,000 “minyan”-level AIPAC donor; says he refuses PAC funds on principle; self-funded ~$62M, second most expensive self-funded Senate campaign in history; only his opponent, Angela Alsobrooks, backed conditioning aid to Israel). https://jewishlouisville.org/in-maryland-aipac-has-poured-4-2m-into-a-congressional-primary-where-israel-is-not-an-issue/ ↩ ↩2
“Congressman Trone: No Ceasefire in Israel Until Hamas Defeated,” Baltimore Jewish Life, November 9, 2023 (remarks to the Baltimore Jewish Council board: “There should be no ceasefire in Israel until Hamas is completely eradicated, and all hostages are safely returned”). Single community-outlet source, with specific corroborating detail (named event, attendee, photograph). https://baltimorejewishlife.com/news/print.php?ARTICLE_ID=167997↩
“Maryland Senate candidate Trone calls for cease-fire, criticizes Israeli military operation in remarks to anti-Zionist activist,” Jewish Insider, January 29, 2024. Trone called for a ceasefire tied to hostage return while stating “my position hasn’t changed” and reaffirming support for Israel’s right to “eliminate Hamas”; the piece still describes him as “the most outspokenly pro-Israel lawmaker” in the Senate race. https://jewishinsider.com/2024/01/maryland-senate-candidate-trone-calls-for-cease-fire-criticizes-israeli-military-operation-in-remarks-to-anti-zionist-activist/↩
IfNotNow, “AIPAC Ally Rep. Trone Backs Permanent Ceasefire, Netanyahu’s Resignation,” March 23, 2024 (Lanham, MD town hall: “Netanyahu has got to go”; “we need a permanent ceasefire and hostage release”; “A life is a life. One Israeli life is the same as one life in Palestine”). https://www.ifnotnowmovement.org/press/aipac-ally-rep-trone-backs-permanent-ceasefire-netanyahus-resignation ↩
Office of Rep. Kathy Manning, “Manning, Smith Lead 210 Members in Bipartisan Letter Denouncing South Africa’s Claims Against Israel at International Court of Justice,” January 23, 2024; the signed letter to Secretary of State Antony Blinken lists “David J. Trone” among the signatories (via the office of Rep. Chris Smith). Trone’s signature was also reported by Jewish Insider, “More than 200 lawmakers condemn South Africa’s genocide case against Israel,” January 24, 2024. https://manning.house.gov/media/press-releases/manning-smith-lead-210-members-bipartisan-letter-denouncing-south-africas | https://chrissmith.house.gov/uploadedfiles/smith_manning_letter_to_sec._blinken_re._south_africa_claims_against_israel_at_ijc_1.23.24.pdf↩